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AN INTRODUCTION TO RACE AS PROXY
Mark R. Bradford*

Sadly, in the end, we do nothing more than quantify race. We quantify race in our nation's schools, seeking a "critical mass" of minority
enrollment. 1 We quantify race in making hiring decisions and investment decisions. Many among us quantify race in determining whom
2
we will scrutinize, avoid, fear, love, and hate.
While the quantification of race reached the forefront of American
debate with the United States Supreme Court's recent decisions in
Grutter v. Bollinger3 and Gratz v. Bollinger,4 it seems that the quanti-

fication of race, the search for racial "equilibrium," and the use of
race as a proxy for making even the most basic and fundamental decisions, has a lasting history. Indeed, uses of race as proxy were born in
this nation more than two hundred years ago, as minorities were consistently commodified into units of labor. We now debate the propriety of redressing such uses of race as proxy in the arena of slave
reparations.5
The use of race as proxy has also long infiltrated our nation's criminal justice system, where law enforcement officers utilize race to de* Mark R. Bradford is a litigation associate at the law firm of Stellato & Schwartz, Ltd. He is
the former Symposium Editor of the DePaulLaw Review (2002-2003), and is a 2003 graduate of
the DePaul University College of Law. The author is forever indebted to Professor Michele
Goodwin, without whom this timely Symposium would not have been possible.
1. See R. Lawrence Purdy, Prelude: Bakke Revisited, 7 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 313, 316 (2003)
(quoting the dean of the highly regarded University of Michigan Law School for the proposition
that, to be properly "diverse," the student body must contain a "critical mass" or "meaningful
numbers" of students from certain racial and ethnic minority groups).
2. Interestingly, it is arguable that "race" is nothing more than a construct of human nature,
with little biological justification. For example, in 1997, the American Anthropological Association recommended that the United States government abandon the use of the term "race" on
official forms because it held no scientific justification in human biology. See Kimberly Hohman,
Race and the Human Genome: Researchers Definitively Trump the Notion of Race with DNA
Research, at http://racerelations.about.com/library/weekly/aaO2l5Ola.htm (last visited Feb. 18,
2004). Indeed, scientists studying the human genome recently concluded that human DNA is
99.9 percent alike, rendering humans nearly genetically identical to each other (but for physical
appearance). See id.
3. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
4. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
5. Even a cursory search of the Internet on the issue of slave reparations yields an untold
number of newspaper and magazine articles, studies, surveys, and commentary representing a
wide variety of viewpoints and conclusions.
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termine who they will stop and question, 6 and juries to determine who
they will sentence to death. 7 Likewise, the use of race as proxy has
seeped into our healthcare system, in which critical decisions such as
the distribution of medication are often made on the basis of one's
race. Indeed, we have become a nation defined, in many ways, by our
ineptitude in reaching a satisfactory understanding of race.
To address these and other critical issues involving race, the DePaul
Law Review presented its 13th Annual Symposium, entitled Race as
Proxy in Law and Society: Emerging Issues in Race and the Law.
Twelve incredibly distinguished panelists presented their views, insights, opinions, and experiences with the use of race as proxy in a
number of legal, social, and moral contexts. This third issue of the
53rd DePaul Law Review is a unique and timely product of the
Symposium.
It is the goal of this publication-and, indeed, of the Symposium-to
challenge its readers and participants to assess their own perspectives
on these vital and controversial issues. Perhaps we can then move
beyond the simple quantification of race that has borne few
fruits-though much debate-over the past three centuries.
I am personally indebted to each of the panelists and writers for
their patience, hard work, intellect, and contributions in planning and
carrying out the Symposium to achieve this lofty goal. On behalf of
the entire DePaulLaw Review, please accept my sincerest thanks, and
enjoy this final product of your labor.

6. For a comprehensive review of racial profiling among law enforcement, including both anecdotal and empirical evidence, see Deborah Ramirez et al., A Resource Guide on Racial Profiling Data Collection Systems: Promising Practices and Lessons Learned (Nov. 2000), at http://

www.ncjrs.org/pdffileslfbja/184768.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2004).
7. This race-based phenomena appears to have been first recognized by the United States
Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), in which Justice Thurgood Marshall
observed: "It is immediately apparent that Negroes were executed far more often than whites in
proportion to their percentage of the population. Studies indicate that while the higher rate of
execution among Negroes is partially due to a higher rate of crime, there is evidence of racial
discrimination." 408 U.S. 238, 364 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).

